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Abstract
We examine entrepreneurship and creative destruction following US banking deregula-
tions using Census Bureau data. US banking reforms brought about exceptional growth
in both entrepreneurship and business closures. Most of the closures, however, were the
new ventures themselves. Although we do ￿nd evidence for the standard story of creative
destruction, the most pronounced impact was a massive increase in churning among new
entrants. We argue that creative destruction requires many business failures along with
the few great successes. The successes are very di¢ cult to identify ex ante, which is why
democratizing entry is an important trait of well-functioning capital markets.
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11 Introduction
A number of recent studies ￿nd a positive relationship between ￿nancial development and eco-
nomic growth across countries (e.g., Beck et al. 2000; Levine 1997; Levine et al. 2000). This
research argues that better ￿nancing environments are associated with higher economic growth,
at least in part, because more e¢ cient ￿nancial sectors facilitate better ex ante allocation of
capital across investment opportunities. By reducing distortions like cronyism, scarce ￿nancing
is reallocated to the most quali￿ed entrepreneurs, ine¢ cient incumbents are displaced, and prod-
uct markets improve due to Schumpeterian creative destruction (e.g., King and Levine 1993a,b;
Rajan and Zingales 2003; Aghion et al. 2007; Chun et al. 2008).
While the cross-country relationship between ￿nance and growth is well documented, em-
pirical work evaluating at the ￿rm level how entrepreneurship and creative destruction follow
from improved ￿nancial conditions is sparse. Most research on ￿nancing constraints considers
established ￿rms (e.g., Banerjee and Du￿ o 2004; Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan and Zingales 1997,
2000; Moyen 2004; Paravisini 2008) or the transition of individuals into entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Hurst and Lusardi 2004; Nanda 2008).
Only a handful of studies examine how changes in ￿nancial markets impact ￿rm entry and exit
in product markets (e.g., Black and Strahan 2002; Guiso et al. 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006;
Zarutskie 2006; Bertrand et al. 2007).
We study how US branch banking deregulations impacted US entrepreneurship rates and
incumbent ￿rm displacement. These reforms, enacted by individual states from the 1970s
onwards, allowed bank entry across state borders and ended local banking monopolies. Bank
debt comprises the majority of US ￿rm borrowings, and new ventures are especially sensitive
to local banking conditions due to their limited options for external ￿nance (e.g., Petersen and
Rajan 1994; Fluck et al. 1998; Berger and Udell 2002). Reducing distortions in the banking
sector can thus have ￿rst-order e⁄ects on entrepreneurship and creative destruction in product
markets. Prior work for the US documents substantial increases in startup activity and to some
degree productivity growth following branch banking deregulations (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan
1996; Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Huang 2008).
Our central contribution is establishing the close link between ￿rm entry and exit patterns
following US banking reforms. While we ￿nd some evidence that supports the standard mecha-
nism espoused for creative destruction, the US experience was much, much messier than the ex
ante story would suggest. US banking reforms brought about exceptional growth in both en-
trepreneurship rates and business closures. Most of these closures, however, were new ventures
themselves, rather than incumbents. Indeed, the greatest increase in entry occurred among very
1small startups that failed within three years of founding. Certainly, some entrants did go on to
challenge incumbents ex post, but these were only a fraction of new ￿rm foundings.
Separating this churning entry from long-term entry is possible due to the micro-data from
the US Census Bureau￿ s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD provides annual
employment data for every US establishment from 1976 onwards. The panel structure of the
data a⁄ords calculations of entry rates, entrant sizes, and subsequent survival of new companies.
We also track employment shares for incumbent ￿rms by state and industry to quantify realized
displacement e⁄ects following from entrepreneurship.
This churning entry helps explain why prior work has found that interstate reforms resulted
in entry increasing by over 10% a year (e.g., Black and Strahan 2002) but no measured e⁄ects
on the ￿rm size distribution (e.g., Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). Likewise, short-lived entrants
partially explain why Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) do not ￿nd that economic growth accelerates
after the interstate deregulations, while they do ￿nd growth e⁄ects following intrastate reforms.
More generally, our results emphasize that failure is a very real part of the entrepreneurial
process. Roughly half of startups close within ￿ve years of entry, even among entrants selected
and supported by sophisticated venture capitalists in well-developed capital markets. It would
thus take exceptionally strong improvements by banks in ex ante project selection to have growth
in entry rates and displacement e⁄ects occur in lockstep. Instead, the data argue for a more
mundane story of creative destruction. US ￿nancial reforms democratized entrepreneurship by
facilitating widespread entry. While US reforms did lead to enhanced competition from longer-
term entrants and a reduction in incumbent market power, the most pronounced impact was a
massive increase in churning among the smallest entrants.
Linking entry with exit also contributes to our general understanding of how product markets
are in￿ uenced by improved ￿nancial sector e¢ ciency (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2007; Cetorelli and
Strahan 2006; Cetorelli 2004; Beck et al. 2008; Levine et al. 2008). Our analysis of the entry size
distribution and long-term survival provides evidence consistent with US deregulations reducing
the importance of being ￿ insiders￿or privileged clients for receiving ￿nancing (e.g., Jayaratne
and Strahan 1996; Laeven 2000; Rajan and Zingales 2003). These results complement the
Bertrand et al. (2007) study of the French banking deregulations￿impact for ￿rms with over
100 employees and the Guiso et al. (2004) study of ￿nancial development in Italy. Our close
attention to smaller ￿rms and failure rates, however, also emphasizes that a substantial share of
product market gains come ex post by simply encouraging the general entrepreneurial process.
These ￿ndings therefore paint a more nuanced picture of how ￿nancial market deregulations
engender creative destruction.
Our second contribution comes through comparisons of startup births and deaths with fa-
cility openings and closures by existing ￿rms. We argue in Section 4 that new establishments
2being opened by multi-unit ￿rms provide a natural baseline against which to measure impacts
for entrepreneurship. We thus use a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences empirical approach to identify the
e⁄ects of deregulations using variation within state-industry-year cells only. From an economet-
ric perspective, this technique provides better identi￿cation than prior studies due to reduced
scope for results being driven by omitted variables. From a substantive perspective, we better
isolate how reforms impacted startups from general economic conditions. This technique may
￿nd application in other settings, too.
Our ￿nal contribution is to study separately the intensive and extensive margins of entry.
Average entry size is a blunt measure for whether eased ￿nancing constraints yielded larger
entrants. Lower ￿nancing constraints may facilitate larger entry sizes for ￿rms that would have
entered regardless (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Cabral and Mata 2003), an intensive margin
e⁄ect that would promote higher average entry sizes. If deregulations also in￿ uence entry rates,
however, average entry sizes will capture changes on both the intensive and extensive margins.
In fact, we show massive entry of very small ￿rms that would tend to decrease average entry
size. We thus study intensive margin e⁄ects through the entry size distribution and the size
of entrants in their ￿rst year compared to subsequent growth. Better ￿nancing environments
helped promote larger entrants among those that survived more than three years.
Section 2 provides an overview of US branch banking deregulations and theoretical predictions
of how banking competition should a⁄ect entrepreneurship. Section 3 introduces the LBD
and describes US entry patterns. Section 4 outlines our identi￿cation strategy and presents
the results. Section 5 concludes our study by identifying further how our results ￿t into the
literature and areas for future research.
2 US Branch Banking Deregulations
Our empirical approach exploits cross-state variation in the timing of US branch banking dereg-
ulations. Prior to these liberalizations, US banks faced multiple restrictions on geographic
expansion both within and across states. The 1970s through the mid 1990s experienced a sig-
ni￿cant liberalization in the ability of banks to establish branches and to expand across state
borders, either through new branches or acquisitions. This section describes these deregulations
and discusses theoretical impacts for entrepreneurship due to greater bank competition.
States historically restricted banking within their borders as a means of public ￿nance. The
McFadden Act of 1927 required national banks obey state-level restrictions on branching, ef-
fectively prohibiting cross-state banking. In addition, many states developed stringent rules
governing the conduct of branch banking within their territories. The most restrictive of these,
3known as unit banking, limited each bank to a single branch. Although banks responded to
these restrictions by forming multibank holding companies (MBHCs) that owned more than one
bank, states in turn restricted activities of MBHCs. Restrictions on intrastate branching for
MBHCs focused on the market share and concentration of these holding companies, while the
Douglas Amendment of 1956 prevented a MBHC from owning banks across state borders.
Two classes of restrictions were eased in the 1970s through 1990s. First, intrastate deregula-
tions for branch banking allowed banks to expand within the passing state if they were licensed
to operate there. One version of this reform facilitated expansion via mergers and acquisitions,
while a second version allowed the opening of de novo branches. Most states introduced these
two variants at about the same time, and we model their leading edge for each state. The
ability to expand within states allowed for more competition in local banking markets, in some
cases even breaking-up e⁄ective monopolies that existed prior to these liberalizations.
Second, interstate deregulations allowed banks to acquire branches in other states with which
their ￿ home state￿had negotiated such a bilateral agreement. This class of reforms further
reduced the monopoly power of local banks, in particular due to the signi￿cant improvements in
the market for corporate control. Interstate deregulations may have also improved economies
of scale, although Berger et al. (2001) argue that subsequent bank mergers resulted in few cost
savings on average. In part due to reciprocal nature of these agreements, most states undertook
interstate deregulations in the mid 1980s to early 1990s.
These state-level reforms culminated in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
E¢ ciency Act of 1994. The Riegle-Neal Act opened up nationwide acquisition of banks across
state lines, regardless of bilateral agreements, unless a state explicitly opted out. In e⁄ect, the
Riegle-Neal Act put out-of-state banks on par with local banks in every state, with important
implications for capital reserves and banking e¢ ciency across the industry. In addition, the
Riegle-Neal Act allowed banks to set up new branches across state borders without the need to
acquire a subsidiary bank, and MBHCs could convert subsidiaries into branches. Kane (1996)
carefully discusses the Riegle-Neal Act.
Only 12 states had some form of intrastate deregulation prior to 1970, and no state allowed
interstate branch banking. Starting in the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, most states
passed both forms of deregulations. Figure 1 plots the cumulative number of states adopting
each reform by year. The appendix lists branch banking deregulations for each state.
Accounts of the political economy of these reforms suggest their passage are mostly exogenous
to product markets, driven in part by federal actions and state-level structures of the banking
industry. Black and Strahan (2001) argue that some of the impetus for intrastate deregulations
came from initiatives taken by the O¢ ce of the Comptroller of the Currency that put banks
4with national charters on par with Savings and Loans (S&Ls) and savings banks that could
branch freely within states. Interstate deregulations were driven in part by the S&L crisis in
the early 1980s when federal legislators allowed failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by banks
in any state, regardless of state laws governing these transactions. These changes paved the
way for bilateral negotiations between states to allow interstate banking in order to foster larger,
diversi￿ed banks that were less susceptible to failure. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) carefully
model how the timing of state deregulations were driven by the relative strength of state interest
groups for or against deregulation. After introducing our data, we show in the next section
that the timings of these reforms are not correlated with pre-existing rates of entrepreneurship
in states.
Interstate liberalizations led to an expansion of large MBHCs across state borders and a
signi￿cant decline in small, local banks (e.g., Janicki and Prescott 2006). Table 1A documents
aggregate changes in the banking sector taken from the LBD. The total number of banks fell
by 30% from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. The share of large banks, de￿ned as having more
than 500 employees, and the share of branches controlled by large banks, increased over the same
period. The fraction of branches controlled by out-of-state banks also grew from 2% to 25%,
suggesting robust cross-state merger activity. These trends are mirrored in studies using bank
assets to measure bank size. Berger et al. (2001) ￿nd that the decline in the number of banks is
almost completely due to reduced numbers of small banks with assets under $100m. Moreover,
the percentage of industry assets managed by ￿ megabanks￿(i.e., with more than $100b in assets)
almost doubled from 1977 to 1994, while the share managed by small banks halved.
Stronger bank competition and markets for corporate control due to US deregulations are
thought to have improved allocative e¢ ciency by allowing capital to ￿ ow more freely towards
projects yielding highest returns. Moreover, although the number of banks fell over this period,
the number of bank branches increased considerably, re￿ ecting greater competition and increased
consumer choice in local markets. From a theoretical perspective, these reforms could have
had a strong positive e⁄ect on entrepreneurship if startups face substantial credit constraints.
Moreover, since entrepreneurs have fewer, non-bank options for ￿nancing their projects relative
to existing ￿rms (e.g., internal cash ￿ ow, bond markets), more e¢ cient allocation of capital
within the banking industry should lead to larger increases in startup entry relative to facility
expansions by existing ￿rms.
However, there are two channels through which these reforms may instead harm startups.
First, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that startups bene￿t from concentrated banking markets
because a monopolist bank can engage in inter-temporal cross-subsidization of loans. As a
monopolist bank can charge above-market interest rates to mature ￿rms, they can in turn charge
below-market rates to potential entrepreneurs. By doing so, the monopolist bank can maximize
5the long-term pool of older ￿rms to which they lend. Increased competition weakens the market
power of local banks for mature ￿rms, reducing their ability to charge above-market rates, and
thereby weakens their incentives for charging below-market rates to new entrants as well.
Second, several studies argue that small banks have a comparative advantage relative to
large banks at making lending decisions for startups because they are better at screening on
￿ soft￿versus ￿ hard￿information (e.g., Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005). If lending decisions at
larger banks are based on more hierarchical decision processes, ultimate adjudication decisions
may come from o¢ cers who do not know potential borrowers personally. These decisions are
more likely to be based on credit scoring models that inherently focus on hard information. On
the other hand, local loan o¢ cers at small banks know information about borrowers that cannot
be condensed into a credit score. This ability to lend and monitor based on soft information may
give local loan o¢ cers a comparative advantage for entrepreneurial ￿nance. Since US banking
reforms led to a shift in industry structure from small banks towards large banks, this could have
had a direct negative e⁄ect on lending to startups relative to established ￿rms with a history of
audited accounts.
The net theoretical e⁄ect of these competing channels is ambiguous, requiring empirical
quanti￿cation. Figure 1 shows that introductions of intrastate and interstate deregulations are
su¢ ciently independent across states that we can jointly investigate their e⁄ect on startup entry.
We prefer to model the reforms jointly to isolate better their respective impacts, but our results
are robust to treating them separately. Intrastate deregulations capture trade-o⁄s between
allocative e¢ ciency from increased competition and potential costs to entrepreneurs from a loss
of concentrated markets. Interstate deregulations capture trade-o⁄s between e¢ ciencies and
potential costs to entrepreneurs due to shifts away from small banks. Our study therefore also
tests for the presence of ￿nancing constraints in entrepreneurship.
3 Longitudinal Business Database
The LBD provides annual employments for every private-sector, US establishment with payroll
from 1976 onwards. The underlying data are sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau
surveys, and approximately 4m establishments and 70m employees are included in the average
year. This study uses micro data spanning the period 1976-2001. The LBD￿ s complete account-
ing of very small ￿rms and establishments, which are often excluded or subsampled in corporate
surveys, is very important for our analysis of entry patterns following banking deregulations.
The LBD also lists physical locations of establishments rather than states of incorporation, cir-
cumventing issues like higher incorporation rates in states like Delaware. Jarmin and Miranda
(2002) provide further details on the LBD construction.
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alone ￿rms from facilities of multi-unit ￿rms. We develop panels of entry and exit by these two
establishment types at state-year and state-industry-year levels. Entrepreneurship is de￿ned
as the entry of new, stand-alone ￿rms. In various analyses, we further separate entrants by
establishment size in year of entry and/or how long the establishment survives. The latter
breakdowns are possible due to unique, time-invariant identi￿ers for each establishment that
can be longitudinally tracked.
For each establishment, we de￿ne its years of entry and exit as the ￿rst and last years of
positive employment, respectively. We do not count cases where a plant temporarily suspends
operations to be an exit and re-entry. We likewise exclude corporate spin-o⁄s. The data start
in 1976, so we can de￿ne entry cohorts from 1977 onwards. In our survival analyses, we consider
whether establishments survive four years or longer. To maintain consistent sample sizes across
speci￿cations, we thus close our analysis with the 1998 entry cohort. Ending in the mid 1990s
is also appropriate given the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act. All of our basic entry and exit
results easily extend to including the 1999-2001 cohorts.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on entrants in our sample. Included sectors are
manufacturing, services, retail trade, wholesale trade, mining, transportation, and construction.
Over 80% of the 409k new establishments opened in each year within these sectors are new
startups. 58% of these entering establishments survive for four or more years. Survival rates
are higher for multi-unit facility expansions at 73% versus 55%.
Figure 2 plots relative entry counts over time for startups and facility expansions, with entry
counts normalized by 1977-1981 levels. While startups constitute most new establishments,
their relative entry has consistently lagged that of facility expansions since the early 1980s.
There is only a 10% increase in the raw number of startup entrants over the twenty-year period,
despite a 20% overall growth in LBD employment. Measured in terms of rates, Davis et al.
(2006) document a substantial reduction in business entry and exit from the late 1970s to the
late 1990s using the LBD. Figure 2 also documents a broad decline in entry during the early
1990s. This decline is consistent with the decline in credit available to ￿rms during this period
(e.g., Berger et al. 2001; Zarutskie 2006).
These aggregate trends are important when interpreting upcoming panel estimation results.
We separately control for aggregate entry or exit rates of startups and facility expansions by
year to remove secular changes that di⁄erentially a⁄ect these groups (e.g., di⁄erent cyclical
volatilities). These aggregate trends, however, include overall movements in credit access that
are partly due to deregulations. The inference of panel estimations using cross-state banking
variation comes in part from greater or weaker relative declines in startup entry and exit rates
for states that have deregulated versus those that have not.
7While startups account for most new establishments, existing ￿rms open new establishments
at larger sizes. Facility expansions start on average with four times the employment of startups,
at 24 versus 6 employees. As can be seen in Table 2, 76% of new startups begin with ￿ve or
fewer employees, versus 44% for facility expansions. Churning establishments tend to enter at
smaller sizes compared to long-term entrants.
Manufacturing accounts for about 10% of entry; manufacturing, services, wholesale trade,
and retail trade jointly account for 75%. Exclusions noted in the comments of Table 2 lower our
sample￿ s share of services relative to overall economic activity. While the sector distributions
of startups and facility expansions are generally comparable, they are quite di⁄erent for retail
trade and construction. Our core estimations control for these di⁄erences across SIC2 industries,
and we have further con￿rmed that our results are robust to excluding these sectors entirely.
Industrial compositions for churning versus long-term entrants are relatively similar.
Despite the well-documented concentration of high-tech entrepreneurship within regions like
Silicon Valley and Boston￿ s Route 128, the broad entry and exit rates we consider are more
evenly spread across US regions. There are also no substantial di⁄erences in the extent to
which startups versus existing ￿rms open new establishments across states. These geographic
regularities aid our using of cross-state variation in banking deregulations to study entrepreneur-
ship. Dunne et al. (1989), Davis et al. (1996), and Glaeser and Kerr (2008) provide additional
details on US entry patterns. Dumais et al. (2002) and Ellison et al. (2007) consider the
agglomeration and coagglomeration of startups and facility expansions, respectively.
With these data, we now return to the timing of the deregulations. The exogeneity of the
banking deregulations for our study would be questionable if the timing of the reforms across
states were systematically associated with pre-existing establishment entry rates. The ￿rst
panel of Figure 3 plots establishment entry rates of states for 1977-1980, the ￿rst four years of
our sample, against the years when states passed the intrastate reform. There is no relationship
evident. Figure 3b likewise shows that changes in entry rates by states from 1977-1978 to 1979-
1980 are not related to the timing of the intrastate deregulations. Finally, the last two panels
of Figure 3 ￿nd the same holds true for the interstate reforms. In all cases, the t-statistics for
the trend lines are less than 0.8. This lack of predictive power gives us additional con￿dence in
the empirical design.
4 Empirical Results
This section reports our empirical results. We ￿rst consider state-year panel estimations that
separately examine entry and exit patterns for startups and facility expansions. These estima-
tions provide the most intuitive presentation of our results. We then turn to stricter frameworks
8that isolate startup entry and exit relative to facility expansions. We close with an analysis of
market concentration.
4.1 Pre-Post Reform Analysis by State-Year
We ￿rst analyze simple panel data models at the state-year level that are traditional for this
literature. These speci￿cations take the form,
ln(BIRs;t) = ￿s + ￿t + ￿TRATRAs;t + ￿TERTERs;t + "s;t: (1)
BIRs;t are counts of entering establishments in state s and year t. We run the speci￿cation
separately for startup entrants and facility expansions, and the same empirical speci￿cation (1)
tests exit, churning, and long-term entry patterns as well. ￿s and ￿t are vectors of state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. State ￿xed e⁄ects control for ￿xed di⁄erences in entry across
states due to factors like California￿ s larger economic size. Year e⁄ects account for aggregate
changes in entry rates over time due to business cycles, national policy changes, and so on.
The variables TRA and TER model intrastate and interstate banking deregulations, respec-
tively, through dichotomous indicator variables. Each indicator variable takes a zero value up
to the year of deregulation in state s and unit value afterwards. The LBD is collected on March
1st of each year. We thus date the reforms such that a passage of TRA in 1987, for example,
is coded as changing from 0 to 1 in 1988. As BIRs;t is measured in logs, the ￿ coe¢ cients
measure the mean percentage increase in a state￿ s annual births after the speci￿ed deregulation.
We cluster standard errors by state to address the serial correlation concerns for di⁄erences-in-
di⁄erences estimations of Bertrand et al. (2004). We weight regressions by the log of 1977-1985
birth employment in the state; these weights do not change across speci￿cations. Weights af-
ford population estimations of treatment e⁄ects, but similar results are obtained in unweighted
regressions.1
These pre-post results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. Column 1 of Table 3 ￿nds a strong
increase in startup births after the interstate deregulations. The elasticity of 6% is statistically
signi￿cant and economically large in size. On the other hand, the intrastate reforms did not lead
to a change in entry patterns. In general, we rarely ￿nd that intrastate reforms had consistent,
material e⁄ects on this study￿ s outcomes. We further discuss this null result in the conclusions.
As a comparison, Black and Strahan (2002) ￿nd 11% and 3% elasticities using Dun & Bradstreet
incorporations data to interstate and intrastate deregulations, respectively. This result is also
1We also include in each regression an interaction of the reforms with an indicator for an Economic Census year
(i.e., 1977, 1982, ..., 1997). In these years, more resources are devoted to updating the business registry. As a
result, longitudinal bumps occur in establishment entry counts for both types of ￿rms. These interactions ￿ exibly
accommodate these shifts, although the interactions are insigni￿cant, and their coe¢ cients are not informative.
They can be excluded without impacting the results. See Autor et al. (2007) for further details.
9con￿rmed in Levine et al. (2008). Several data sources are thus pointing to a large impact on
US entrepreneurship from the interstate deregulations.
Column 2 of Table 3 ￿nds a 3% increase in facility expansions after interstate deregulations.
This elasticity, which is also statistically signi￿cant and economically important in size, suggests
that the startup entry response in Column 1 likely combines speci￿c bene￿ts for entrepreneurship
with more general economic development that indirectly increased new ￿rm entry, too. We will
formally compare startup and facility expansion responses below to tease out the causal e⁄ect
for entrepreneurship itself.
While Columns 1 and 2 could be consistent with the standard mechanism espoused for
creative destruction ￿ more e¢ cient ￿nancial sectors promoting higher quality entrants that will
displace incumbents ￿ the remaining columns of Panel A demonstrate that the US experience
was also about democratizing the entry process. Columns 3-6 separate entrants by the number
of years they survive. Churning entrants, de￿ned to be those that close within three years
of founding, rose in step with entrants that survived longer. Likewise, to the extent that
business closures are found to increase after the interstate reforms with speci￿cation (1), it is
among single-unit ￿rms themselves. Pre-post speci￿cations are blunt instruments, however,
for measuring these extended e⁄ects on the product markets that often take several years to
materialize. We thus turn next to more nuanced speci￿cations that portray the underlying
dynamics.
4.2 Dynamic Speci￿cations by State-Year
The panels of Figure 4 document the raw dynamics of entry associated with the banking reforms
through the speci￿cation,






￿TER;t+q￿TERs;t+q + "s;t: (2)
The variables ￿TRAs;t+q are twenty separate indicator variables modelling the passage of the
TRA reform. These dummy variables take a value of one in the qth year before or after the
TRA deregulation and are zero otherwise. The -10 and +10 year endpoints include all years
earlier and later than our twenty-year window. We do not include an indicator for the year
of the deregulation itself, so that the ￿ coe¢ cients measure the year-by-year dynamics of entry
relative to reform years. The TER lag structure is similarly de￿ned. While we split the
intrastate and interstate patterns into two graphs, they are estimated jointly. The dashed lines
plot 95% con￿dence intervals for the point estimates. We also test the extended dynamics of
establishment closures through model (2).
10The patterns are striking. Lead e⁄ects for both reforms are relatively small, especially just
prior to the reform￿ s passage, and are not statistically di⁄erent from zero. There may have
been a slight rise in entry over the seven years prior to the intrastate reforms, while the opposite
is true for the interstate reforms. It should be noted, however, the panel is unbalanced for
earlier lead e⁄ects as our data start in 1977, well within the ten-year window for states that
deregulated early. Looking after the TRA reform, no changes in entry or closures are evident.
On the other hand, large increases in establishment births and closures are evident after the
interstate deregulations. Moreover, entry increases after the reforms at a rate consistent with
growing ￿nancial access due to greater bank competition. The appendix further reports the
extended dynamics separately for single-unit and multi-unit entrants and closures. The patterns
are similar across the two types of ￿rms, with the single-unit responses to the interstate reforms
exceeding the multi-unit responses and coming earlier.
We now turn to two speci￿cations that summarize the major features of these dynamics.
Panel B of Table 3 quanti￿es the growing treatment e⁄ects evident in Figure 4 through linear
treatment e⁄ect speci￿cations. In these speci￿cations, TRA and TER continue to take a zero
value up to the year of deregulation. They then take a value of one in the year of the reforms,
a value of two in the second year after the reforms, and so on. As the treatment e⁄ects visibly
￿ atten after four years, we cap the linear treatment at four years.
The results in Panel B are much more precisely estimated than those in Panel A. Accounting
for growing treatment e⁄ects after the reforms is clearly important. Startup entry is again found
to increase more after the interstate reforms than facility expansions, although the latter does
increase too. The treatment e⁄ects for churning startups are substantial, rising 6% per year
through the ￿rst four years. This growth e⁄ect is stronger than the long-term entrants evident
in Column 5. The last two columns ￿nd that closures for startups grow with time, while the
establishment closures of multi-unit ￿rms continue to be weakly a⁄ected.
Table 4 provides a more ￿ exible speci￿cation than the linear treatment e⁄ects model. We
include four indicator variables for each reform. The ￿rst indicator variable is for the two years
prior to the reform￿ s passage. The second indicator is for the year of the reform and the following
year. The third indicator is for the second and third year after the reform. The ￿nal indicator
variable is for the fourth year after the reform and later. Elasticities measured through this
approach are relative to the period three years or earlier before the given deregulation. This non-
parametric approach is a parsimonious way of capturing the major features of the raw dynamics
in Figure 4. It is also more appropriate for analyzing the LBD given the short window prior to
the earliest of the reforms.
The pattern of entry e⁄ects after the interstate reforms is consistent with the earlier re-
sults. This technique estimates a 23% higher startup entry four or more years after the reform,
11compared to 12% for facility expansions. Separating entrant types, the interstate reforms are
associated with a 28% and 19% increase in churning and long-run entry for startups, respec-
tively. This 19% estimate might be overstated too, as a sizeable forward e⁄ect is evident in
Column 5. It should be noted, however, that forward e⁄ects are hard to interpret in churn-
ing and long-term entrant estimations. Establishments are categorized based upon survival,
and changes in banking conditions and associated product market environments in period t can
clearly in￿ uence whether entrants in the t ￿ 1 cohort survive for four years or not. Heightened
closures of single-unit ￿rms are evident four or more years after the interstate reforms, when the
churning entrants begin exiting.
We have performed a number of robustness checks on these basic state-year outcomes. Ap-
pendix Tables 2 and 3 show that entry patterns are robust to including linear state time trends
that center identi￿cation on discontinuities surrounding the reforms. Unreported estimations
also consider responses within each sector. The basic patterns are economically and statisti-
cally important sector-by-sector, with somewhat stronger e⁄ects evident in wholesale and retail
trade than manufacturing or services. The patterns are also robust to excluding in￿ uential
states (e.g., Wall 2004). Excluding California has the largest e⁄ect, but point estimates only
decline by about a tenth from their full sample values. While these tests provide added con￿-
dence, the Census data allow greater empirical leverage than state-year estimations for showing
identi￿cation. We take this up next.2
4.3 Relative Entry Analysis by State-Industry-Type-Year
State-year analyses provide an intuitive presentation of our ￿ndings, but omitted variable biases
are a natural concern with this estimation technique. Figure 3 did not ￿nd a pre-existing rela-
tionship between state-level entrepreneurship rates and the timing of the reforms. Nevertheless,
other secular changes at the state-year level may still be biasing the parameter estimates. To
address this liability, recent research exploits industry-level variation within states (e.g., Cetorelli
and Strahan 2006). These studies follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) by grouping industries ac-
cording to the degree to which they are dependent upon external ￿nance or not. This additional
variation allows researchers to control for state-year and industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects. E⁄ects for
industries dependent upon external ￿nance are contrasted with less dependent industries before
and after the reforms. While this industry di⁄erential is more robust than state-year panels, it
2We have also tested the mechanism implied by our reduced-form indicators for interstate deregulations. Using
the LBD, we document sharp growth in out-of-state banks occurred in states after their interstate deregulations.
Moreover, much of this growth was driven by large banks with an average of 500 or more employees over the
period 1977-1985. These simple estimates con￿rm deregulation￿ s role in the descriptive statistics outlined in
Tables 1A and 1B. While we prefer the reduced-form approach of modelling deregulations, due to LBD data
collection limitations for the ￿nancial sector prior to 1992, evidence for the expected mechanism of out-of-state
banks is evident in the data.
12naturally cannot address omitted factors that operate at the state-industry-year level. These
more granular factors are particularly apt to emerge in agglomerated industries (e.g., high-tech
in California, automotive in Michigan).3
The detailed establishment-level data in the LBD a⁄ord an even stronger approach. We
speci￿cally contrast the entry of startup ￿rms with the entry of facility expansions by multi-unit
￿rms. We use facility expansions, rather than ￿rm growth through employment adjustments
at existing plants, to create a baseline with similar discontinuous ￿nancing requirements. We
believe that facility expansions can serve as an appropriate control group conditional on removing
the aggregate di⁄erences and trends documented in Figure 2. The dynamic state-year regressions
in Table 4 suggest this identi￿cation strategy is reasonable. Facility expansion patterns are very
similar to startups prior to reforms, and dynamic growth patterns for facility expansions following
deregulations are quite reasonable.
This di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach also enables us to control for state-industry-year ef-
fects. While this test is substantially more powerful than previous approaches, it is clearly
not foolproof either. For example, states could have passed other reforms in parallel to bank-
ing deregulations that di⁄erentially in￿ uenced startup ￿rms from facility expansions. While
acknowledging this issue, we also believe these concerns are mitigated by both cross-state varia-
tion in the timing of deregulations and the overall economic importance of the banking deregu-
lations. It is much more challenging to construct competing explanations when variations with
state-industry-year cells are exploited. Our identi￿cation strategy also has a useful substantive
interpretation in that it teases out di⁄erential responses of startups to banking deregulations
over and above heightened facility expansions of existing ￿rms. Since startups are particularly
dependent on banks for external ￿nance, these results can also be interpreted as quantifying
how much more important changes in banking competition are for entrepreneurship relative to
existing ￿rms.
To implement this technique, we organize entrant counts in the LBD to be by state-industry-
type-year, where "type" indicates whether the entrant is a startup ￿rm or not. We denote
industries with i and entrant types with x. The addition of 51 SIC2 industries and 2 entrant
types results in over 100k state-industry-type-year cells. As an analog to the state-year pre-post






The ￿xed e⁄ects are very important for understanding this estimation. ￿s;i;x is a vector of
cross-sectional ￿xed e⁄ects at the state-industry-type level similar to the state vector ￿s in the
3Variations in how external ￿nance is de￿ned or the time period studied can also lead to di⁄erent industry
groupings. Regardless, it is important that cross-sectional ￿xed e⁄ects be included along with state-industry-
year e⁄ects in estimations. Several studies model state-year and industry-year longitudinal e⁄ects, but omit
cross-sectional controls. This omission may bias estimates due to the non-proportional allocation of industries
across states.
13state-year analyses. Likewise, ￿t;x extends the earlier vector of year ￿xed e⁄ects ￿t to be instead
by type-year. These two extensions allow startups and facility expansions to have independent
panel e⁄ects as in the separated regressions of Tables 3 and 4. By doing so, we fully control for
levels di⁄erences and secular changes like those noted in Figure 2. Finally, state-industry-year
￿xed e⁄ects ￿s;i;t fully absorb secular changes in local industrial conditions common to startups
and facility expansions.
The TRA and TER deregulation indicators from (2) are interacted with whether the entrant
type is a startup ￿rm or not (Typex). As state-industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects saturate the model,
the dynamic coe¢ cients for startup ￿rms become relative to responses of facility expansions.
Indeed, this speci￿cation is only possible by contrasting entrant types within state-industry-year
cells, and separate coe¢ cients for facility expansions are no longer estimated. This structure
also demonstrates the comparability of our count-based estimations with entry-rate formulations
relative to local cell sizes.4
Table 5 presents these relative models in a format similar to Table 3. Consistent with
the impression given by the state-year panels, startups exhibit higher entry and exit increases
after the interstate deregulations than facility expansions. The relative increase in churning
is especially pronounced, which ties the growth of entry and exit together. Relative increases
long-term entry, while present, are more modest in comparison to increases in churning. These
results are also con￿rmed in the linear treatment e⁄ects speci￿cation in Panel B of Table 5.
Table 6 extends the dynamic speci￿cations in a similar manner. These are our preferred
estimates given the robustness of the estimation technique and the dynamic modelling. The
￿rst column ￿nds that entry of startups was 11% higher than facility expansions in the long-
run after interstate deregulations. This elasticity is statistically signi￿cant and economically
important, and the dynamic structure of e⁄ects is also reasonable. The fourth column of Table
6 demonstrates that growth in closures for single-unit ￿rms substantially exceeded growth in
plant closures by multi-unit ￿rms. The long-term exit di⁄erential is 17%. The second column
shows again how much of this death was entrants themselves, with churning entry increasing
by 22% for startups relative to facility expansions. The third column shows a more muted
6% response for long-term entry. The intrastate deregulations are again found to have limited
long-term e⁄ects on startup entry, with a transitory dip evident in the second and third lags.
4The appendix shows how dropping state-industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects from (3) returns results similar to the
separated state-year regressions. The only di⁄erence is the added industry dimension.
Similar to the earlier speci￿cations, we include interactions for Economic Census years and weight the regres-
sions by the 1977-1985 birth employments in the state-industry cell. While all state-year observations have
startup and facility expansions, this is not true at the industry level. To maintain a consistent observation
count in log speci￿cations, we recode a zero entry count as one and include unreported dummies for zero count
observations by type. The results are robust to dropping these observations entirely; in general, these cells
receive very small weight.
14In comparing coe¢ cients across Table 6￿ s columns, the higher relative magnitude for business
closures (17%) compared to entry (11%) clearly does not suggest an absolute decline in small
businesses. Table 3 shows otherwise. The di⁄erential for startup exits, relative to multi-unit
facility closures, is higher due to the churning outcome. In the growing US economy, ￿rm starts
are greater in number than ￿rm closures throughout the period studied. Adding these churning
establishments to these starts and exits results in a higher elasticity for exits.
As a ￿nal note, we have tested jointly our relative startup di⁄erentials with di⁄erences across
industries in dependence on external ￿nance. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), Cetorelli and
Strahan (2006), and Aghion et al. (2007), we constructed measures of industry-level dependence
on external ￿nance from Compustat data. Relative entry elasticities for ￿nancially-dependent
sectors are typically higher than those for non-dependent industries, but the di⁄erentials are
often not economically large or statistically signi￿cant. Di⁄erences within manufacturing ￿
the typical sector studied in these dependency tests ￿ are stronger and statistically di⁄erent.
4.4 Churning and Long-Term Entrant Size Distribution
We next examine the size distribution of churning and long-term entrants. Characterizing
relative entry e⁄ects across the establishment size distribution provides a richer description
of whether and how creative destruction followed from US deregulations. This analysis also
identi￿es whether the extensive margin e⁄ects discussed thus far are complemented by intensive
margin e⁄ects, too.
Theoretical models suggest that even if potential entrepreneurs are not precluded from start-
ing new businesses due to ￿nancing constraints, they may still start ￿rms that are smaller than
optimal for the projects at hand (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989). As increased relative entry
rates for entrepreneurs point to ￿nancing constraints for potential entrepreneurs being eased, we
may also ￿nd e⁄ects in the intensive margin of initial ￿rm employment.
Tables 7 and 8 present the relative entry count speci￿cation with entrants grouped into four
size categories based upon employment in the year of entry: 1-5 employees, 6-20 employees,
21-100 employees, and over 100 employees. Coe¢ cients on banking reform indicators in these
regressions estimate the relative elasticity of startup entry to facility expansions by size group.
We report speci￿cations for churning and long-term entrants. Overall entry responses are a
blend of these two types and are reported in the appendix.
The results are striking. Relative churning entry increased dramatically among entrants with
20 employees or fewer. The long-term e⁄ect is estimated to be 23% and 29% for the 1-5 and 6-20
entrant size categories, respectively. The relative increase was only 10% for entrants with 21-100
15employees, and no growth in churning occurred for entrants with over 100 employees. These
churning di⁄erences across entrant size categories are statistically signi￿cant. This substantial
increase in the entry of new establishments that fail within three years was not just a consequence
of banks learning about di⁄erent markets following the deregulations. The dynamic pattern
suggests the churning e⁄ect grew over time after deregulations were introduced. This pattern
is also much messier than a model of improved ex ante allocative e¢ ciency on the part of
banks would have suggested. We believe that interstate deregulations also ￿ democratized￿entry.
Many, many more ￿rms were started, some of which ultimately competed with and displaced
incumbents. A large number of these entrants, however, failed along the way.
By contrast, growth for long-term entrants was much more uniform across the entrant size
distribution. The contrast to the skewed churning distribution is visibly evident. The largest
relative increase in entry was again among 6-20 employees at 17%, but the responses in the other
categories are comparable at 4%-9%. We take this uniformity as evidence for the standard
model of creative destruction. Since establishments entering in these larger size categories are
not as likely to be credit constrained on the extensive margin, these results are consistent with
improvements in allocative e¢ ciency following the deregulations. That is, startup ￿rms may
have received ￿nancing for projects that they would not have prior to the deregulations because
they were not ￿ insiders￿or past clients of banks.
In addition to characterizing the channels of creative destruction, these distributions also
suggest both extensive and intensive margin e⁄ects from ￿nancing constraints for entrepreneur-
ship. Extensive margins e⁄ects clearly lie behind the greater entry increases among the smallest
￿rms. The peak within the 6-20 employee category is particularly suggestive of bank lending.
Entrants with fewer than six employees may be able to substitute personal savings and funds
from friends and family for bank loans, but this is less likely to be true for those trying to enter
at somewhat larger ￿rm sizes (e.g., Fluck et al. 1998).
Although weaker, the growth in long-term entrants among the larger size groups is also
indicative of interstate reforms having an intensive margin e⁄ect as well. It is unlikely that
changes in bank ￿nancing conditions would have produced extensive margin e⁄ects in these
larger groups. Instead, the increased relative entry in these largest categories likely follows
from startups, which would have entered regardless of the reforms, entering at larger sizes. The
distribution of e⁄ects is thus consistent with ￿nancing constraints impacting both extensive and
intensive margins of entrepreneurship. We next discuss a more formal test of intensive margin
e⁄ects through employment growth in establishments.
164.5 Intensive Margin E⁄ects of Entrant Size
Empirically identifying the e⁄ect of changes in ￿nancing constraints on the intensive margin of
entry is complicated by the fact that there are simultaneous changes in both the extensive and
the intensive margins. The ideal estimations would compare entry sizes before and after the
reforms for ￿rms that would have entered regardless of the banking deregulations. In this case,
average entry size could be an appropriate metric. Earlier estimations, however, document that
greater entry is facilitated by deregulations, and we do not have a way of distinguishing which
￿rms would have entered in the counterfactual. This is particularly true at the lower end of the
size distribution, where we might expect to see the strongest e⁄ects on both the intensive and
extensive margins of greater ￿nancial access.
To con￿rm this intensive margin e⁄ect, we undertake a second test with our long-term en-
trants that survive four years or longer. We calculate for each of these entrants the ratio of
their initial employment size to the maximum employment size obtained by the establishment
in the ￿rst three years of operation. We then calculate the mean of this entry size ratio by
state-industry-type-year cells. Examining the unweighted means across these cells, startup ￿rms
and facility expansions enter at 68% and 75% of their maximum three-year sizes, respectively.
These lower relative entry sizes for startups may directly re￿ ect ￿nancing constraints on the
intensive margin, but the di⁄erential may include other factors like increased caution due to
greater uncertainty. To assess whether ￿nancing constraints play an important role, we test
whether startups enter closer to their maximum three-year sizes after the banking deregulations
using the relative framework (3). This approach provides a more direct metric of ￿nancing
constraints on the intensive margin by looking within-establishment rather than at the cross-
section of entry. It is potentially limited, however, by the conditioning on survival for three
years.5
These estimations again ￿nd no measurable impact on the intensive margin following in-
trastate deregulations. Following interstate deregulations, however, there was a 2% increase
in startup entry sizes compared to three-year maximums. This estimate is economically and
statistically signi￿cant. This estimation is again a relative comparison to facility expansions,
providing evidence that entrepreneurs in particular are able to enter closer to their optimal
project sizes following deregulations. While a full analysis of entry sizes requires a broader
investigation of the ￿rm size distribution, this result again suggests that e⁄ects of ￿nancing
constraints for entrepreneurship are present on both the extensive and intensive entry margins.
5In particular, startups have di⁄erent hazard functions of failure relative to facility expansions, and this may
introduce some bias in the mean ratios. The three-year window trades o⁄ this survival bias with allowing more
time for new establishments to reach their desired size (e.g., due to internal cash ￿ ows or better external ￿nancing
opportunities).
174.6 Incumbent Displacement Analysis
We now test whether the massive entry subsequent to interstate reforms resulted in incumbent
displacement along the lines of the creative destruction story. Tables 9 and 10 test this prediction
using state-industry-year data. Summing across establishments, we identify the ten largest ￿rms
for each state-industry in 1980. We then track the employment market share of these ￿rms in
ensuing years. All speci￿cations include state-industry and industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects and weight
by initial employments in the state-industry cell.
Column 1 ￿nds a 5% decline in the log market share of these incumbents after interstate
deregulations. Evaluated at the sample mean, this would be a modest decline of about 1% of
the state-industry￿ s employment in these incumbent ￿rms. This e⁄ect is not precisely measured,
although it is when adding a linear state trend in Column 2. A variety of robustness checks
suggest this decline in incumbent concentration is modestly stable. Similar results, for example,
are found when looking at the market shares of the top three or ￿ve incumbents. On the other
hand, null results are found in unweighted or non-logged regressions. As an alternative, Columns
3 through 6 test whether overall market concentration changed after the reforms, ignoring the
incumbent distinction. The log market share of the top ten ￿rms by state-industry does decline
by 2%-3% in the long-run after interstate deregulations. This decline is quite robust across
speci￿cation variants. On the other hand, no signi￿cant change in market concentration is
evident with a normalized Her￿ndahl-Hirschman index.
Looking across the speci￿cations, we believe a modest decline in incumbent and market con-
centration occurred after interstate deregulations. These changes in overall market leadership
were, however, much smaller than entrepreneurship growth due to the churning result docu-
mented above. These di⁄erentials, versus speci￿c elasticities in Tables 9 and 10, are what we
hope to emphasize. Interestingly, Bertrand et al. (2007) ￿nd stronger e⁄ects of banking reforms
on incumbents in France. Di⁄erences between our studies are likely tied to pre-reform banking
conditions in the two countries. Future research needs to connect initial conditions with how
banking reforms operate; this will be a key input for policy makers.
5 Conclusions
Theoretical models and policy discussions often describe how more competitive ￿nancial sectors
improve product markets with phrases like greater e¢ ciency, better investment choices, reduced
cronyism, replacement of unproductive incumbents, and so on. We ￿nd evidence for these e⁄ects
in the US experience. But, we also believe the inherent messiness and ex ante unpredictability
of the process is under-appreciated. Although we ￿nd evidence that US banking deregulations
18led to increased competition through longer-term entry, the reforms led to an even larger amount
of churning. Entrepreneurship and creative destruction require many, many business failures
along with the few great successes. Who the few great successes will be is rarely known ex ante
even to venture capitalists, which is why democratizing entry may be so important for the link
between well-functioning capital markets and creative destruction. Using Census Bureau data,
this paper documents this through several ￿ndings.
First, entrepreneurship grew substantially after interstate banking deregulations. This was
true even when compared against the baseline of facility expansions by multi-unit ￿rms. Second,
business closures grew after the deregulations, too. This second fact is tightly linked to the
￿rst, as most closures were new startups themselves. Our examination of the entrant size
distribution shows that this increased churning was concentrated among very small entrants.
Third, deregulations did promote long-term entry as well. Moreover, these long-term entrants
were able to enter at larger employment sizes upon founding. This provides evidence for
both extensive and intensive margin e⁄ects of ￿nancing constraints on entrepreneurs. Finally,
incumbent concentration declined somewhat after the reforms. These concentration changes
were much weaker, however, than the entrepreneurship response due to the churning element.
The macroeconomic trends presented in this paper also shed light on why studies regarding
the e⁄ects of banking competition on small businesses have had somewhat contradictory results.
Consistent with the literature documenting a fall in credit extended to small businesses in the
early 1990s (e.g., Berger et al. 2001; Zarutskie 2006), we also ￿nd a dip in startup activity
over that period. Indeed, we further document how the relative growth of startup entry has
lagged behind the growth of establishment openings by existing ￿rms since the late 1970s (e.g.,
Davis et al. 2006). The positive elasticities of our panel estimations, however, suggest that
increases in banking competition in part dampened national declines in startup entry in states
that deregulated interstate branch banking relative to states that did not.
Our analysis raises important questions for future research. First, what factors lie behind
the greater churn? Certainly, greater competition will lead to higher failure rates. The con-
centration of failures among small startups, however, suggests that there is more to the story.
Possible explanations can be found on the entrepreneur and bank sides. For entrepreneurs,
lower ￿nancing constraints may lead to weaker or more frivolous entry (e.g., de Meza 2002).
Nanda (2008) ￿nds evidence for this in the context of Danish entrepreneurs. Understanding
the role of consumption entrepreneurship is important for evaluating how well increases in entry
rates after policy changes measure lasting economic e⁄ects. Moreover, a better understanding
of entrant types is important for welfare evaluation, about which we are silent.
A second hypothesis is that the churning results from structural changes in the banking
sector. The repeated emphasis on entrepreneurship following from interstate deregulations, but
19not from intrastate reforms, suggests that such structural changes would be linked to the growth
of large, cross-state banks. Decline in relationship banking is a very prominent candidate.
Changes in bank organization may have led to di⁄erent lending strategies (e.g., Berger et al.
2005; Sah and Stiglitz 1986) or weakened the ability of banks to evaluate small business projects,
with negative consequences for the survival of startups. On the other hand, the higher churning
result may imply greater e¢ ciency in that banks were less likely to ration credit following the
reforms (e.g., Canales and Nanda 2008) or quicker to terminate weaker ￿rms (e.g., Gine and
Love 2006). The interstate reforms brought signi￿cant changes to several aspects of banking
￿ markets for corporate control, allocation of credit, technology di⁄usion ￿ that should be
investigated in the entrepreneurial context.
Such an approach may also be fruitful in helping to understand the mechanisms through
which the banking sector impacts changes in the product market. While both the intrastate
and the interstate reforms brought about some measure of competition in the banking sector,
our study suggests that the former did not have a substantive impact on the real economy. One
explanation may hinge on the extent of competition that was generated through the intrastate
reform. It is conceivable that the market for corporate control must be larger than an individual
state to be e⁄ective. A second explanation may hinge on the kind of technology used in bank
lending to small businesses. If larger, multi-state banks were more likely to invest in technology
that would better serve startups, this may explain why the interstate deregulations had a much
more profound impact on entry than the intrastate reforms. The di⁄erential e⁄ect of these
reforms remains a puzzle, however, and further work on untangling these di⁄erences is critical to
understand the mechanisms connecting ￿nancial sector reforms to changes in the real economy.
A second important area for future research is better linking entrepreneurship with aggregate
productivity changes. Our entry and exit results help reconcile apparent contradictions in the
￿nance literature around the US banking reforms. Interstate banking deregulations have been
associated with massive entry but little change in the ￿rm size distribution and productivity
growth (e.g., Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Jayaratne and Strahan 1996).
While seemingly at odds, the churning growth ties these ￿ndings together nicely.
Questions remain for the Schumpeterian creative destruction story, however. A number of
studies regarding aggregate productivity growth emphasize the importance of production reallo-
cations to more e¢ cient ￿rms versus within-establishment growth (e.g., Foster et al. 2001). It
is puzzling that the productivity growth documented in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) is associ-
ated with intrastate deregulations, which are not associated with increases in entrepreneurship
or business turnover. In an important recent study, Huang (2008) ￿nds that the productivity
growth associated with intrastate reforms is concentrated among several states that also closely
passed interstate deregulations. By carefully identifying where entrepreneurship and productiv-
ity e⁄ects exist, perhaps the creative destruction story behind the US banking deregulations will
20become even clearer. It is interesting, however, that this puzzle extends beyond banking. Davis
et al. (2006) note that the aggregate US trend towards declining ￿rm volatility from the 1970s
onward is di¢ cult to reconcile with large US aggregate productivity gains over the same period
using standard Schumpeterian theories. We clearly have much more to learn about how banking
competition, entrepreneurship, creative destruction, and productivity growth all tie together.
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Fig. 1: US Branch Banking Deregulations
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Notes:   Figure 1 plots the cumulative number of states passing the Intra-State and Inter-State reforms by year.  Figure 2 plots establishment 
entry rates over the 1977-1996  period calculated from the LBD.  These entry counts are relative to the 1977-1981 period.  TotalU S  
employment in the LBD is also given as reference.y = 0.0003x - 0.379
R² = 0 0034
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Fig. 3a: Intra-State Reform Timing
Against 1977-1980 Entry Rates


































Fig. 3b: Intra-State Reform Timing
Against 1977 1978 to 1979 1980 Entry Rate Changes
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Year of Intra-State Deregulation
Notes:   Figures plot pre-existing entry rates for establishments against years of deregulation.  Levels of entry rates in Figures 3a and 3c are 
calculated as entering establishments divided by total establishment counts during 1977-1980.  Changes in entry rates in Figures 3b and 3d are 
calculated as change from 1977-1978 to 1979-1980 compared to the national average.y = 0.0019x - 3.5352
R²=0 0163
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Fig. 3c: Inter-State Reform Timing
Against 1977-1980 Entry Rates 


































Fig. 3d: Inter-State Reform Timing
Against 1977 1978 to 1979 1980 Entry Rate Changes
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Year of Inter-State Deregulation
Notes:   Figures plot pre-existing entry rates for establishments against years of deregulation.  Levels of entry rates in Figures 3a and 3c are 
calculated as entering establishments divided by total establishment counts during 1977-1980.  Changes in entry rates in Figures 3b and 3d are 



















































Fig 4b: Intra-State Dynamics, Closures
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Years Relative to Intra-State Deregulations
Notes:   Figures plot coefficients from regressions of log entry counts or closure counts on a series of indicator variables extending from 10 
years before the reform’s passage to 10 years afterwards.  The end points include all earlier and later years.  The indicator variable for the year 
of the reform is omitted, so that coefficients are measured relative to entry or closure rates in the year of the reform.  State and year effects are 
included in regressions.  While split between two graphs, the raw dynamics surrounding the passage of the intra-state and inter-state reforms 
are estimated jointly.  The dashed lines present 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered by state.  The appendix provides 
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Years Relative to Inter-State Deregulations























































Years Relative to Inter-State Deregulations
Notes:   Figures plot coefficients from regressions of log entry counts or closure counts on a series of indicator variables extending from 10 
years before the reform’s passage to 10 years afterwards.  The end points include all earlier and later years.  The indicator variable for the year 
of the reform is omitted, so that coefficients are measured relative to entry or closure rates in the year of the reform.  State and year effects are 
included in regressions.  While split between two graphs, the raw dynamics surrounding the passage of the intra-state and inter-state reforms 
are estimated jointly.  The dashed lines present 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered by state.  The appendix provides 









































































































































































App. 1b: Intra-State, MU Birth
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    % owned by banks with 500+ employees
Table 1A:  LBD-Based Descriptive Statistics on US Banking Industry
Total Number of Banking Organizations
    % with fewer than 50 employees
    % with branches in multiple states
Total Number of Banking Branches
Real Gross Industry Assets (in trillions of 1994 dollars)
Industry Assets in Megabanks (more than $100b in assets)
Industry Assets in Small Banks (less than $100m in assets)
Notes:  Data taken from Berger et al. (2001).
    % owned by banks with mean 500+ employees before 1985
    % owned by banks originally located in other states
Notes:  Descriptive details are taken from LBD for SIC 602 (1987 classifications).
Table 1B:  Asset-Based Descriptive Statistics on US Banking Industry
Total Number of Banking Organizations
    Small Banks (less than $100m in assets)All New Multi-Unit All New Multi-Unit All New Multi-Unit
Entrants Single-Unit Facility Entrants Single-Unit Facility Entrants Single-Unit Facility
Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions
Mean Annual Entry (k) 409 336 73 173 153 20 236 183 53
Share of Entrants 82% 18% 42% 37% 5% 58% 45% 13%
Size Distribution
    1-5 Employees 70.3% 76.0% 44.1% 76.3% 79.5% 51.6% 65.9% 73.0% 41.3%
    6-20 Employees 22.8% 19.7% 36.9% 18.6% 16.9% 31.7% 25.9% 22.1% 38.9%
    21-100 Employees 5.8% 3.8% 14.9% 4.4% 3.2% 13.3% 6.9% 4.3% 15.6%
    100+ Employees 1.1% 0.4% 4.1% 0.8% 0.4% 3.4% 1.3% 0.5% 4.3%
Sector Distribution
    Manufacturing 9% 9% 6% 8% 9% 7% 9% 10% 6%
    Services 28% 29% 23% 30% 30% 24% 27% 29% 22%
    Wholesale Trade 12% 11% 17% 11% 10% 18% 12% 12% 17%
    Retail Trade 25% 22% 42% 24% 23% 38% 26% 21% 44%
    Mining 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
    Construction 17% 20% 1% 18% 20% 2% 16% 21% 1%
    Transportation 7% 7% 10% 7% 7% 11% 7% 7% 9%
Geographic Distribution
    Northeast 19% 20% 17% 18% 18% 17% 20% 21% 17%
    South 36% 35% 37% 37% 37% 37% 35% 34% 37%
    Midwest 22% 21% 24% 20% 20% 23% 23% 22% 24%
    West Coast 24% 24% 22% 24% 25% 23% 23% 23% 22%
Table 2:  LBD Descriptive Statistics on US Product Markets
Entering Establishments Churning Entrants (Survive ≤ 3 Yrs.) Long-Term Entrants (Survive ≥ 4 Yrs.)
Notes:  Table documents descriptive statistics for establishments outside of the financial sector in the Longitudinal Business Database.  Statistics are calculated for entrants 
between 1977-1998 using data extending to 2001.  Single-unit start-ups are new firm formations.  Multi-unit facility expansions are new establishment openings by existing 
firms.  Churning entrants are establishments closing within three years of entry.  Long-term entrants are establishments surviving four or more years.  Entry size distributions are 
calculated from year of establishment entry.  Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the LBD.  Sectors not included in the LBD are agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, public administration, and private households.  We also exclude the US postal service, restaurants and food stores, hospitals, education services, and social services.  
These exclusions lower the services share relative to other sectors.  Incomplete LBD records require dropping 25 state-year files: 1978 (12 states), 1983 (4), 1984 (4), 1985 (1), 
1986 (1), 1989 (1), and 1993 (2).New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Firms Facility
Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Closures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intra-State Banking  0.002 -0.010 -0.027 -0.007 0.027 -0.011 -0.059 -0.033
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.016) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Inter-State Banking  0.060 0.032 0.051 0.044 0.071 0.028 0.018 -0.017
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.020) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
Number of Years Since  -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.008 -0.001
Intra-State Banking Reform (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Number of Years Since  0.050 0.026 0.063 0.037 0.041 0.022 0.037 0.006
Inter-State Banking Reform (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
B. Linear Treatment Effect Specifications
Notes: Panel estimations consider establishment entry and exit patterns taken from the LBD for 1977-1998.  Dependent variables are indicated in column headers.  Single-
unit start-ups are new firm formations.  Multi-unit facility expansions are new establishment openings by existing firms.  Churning entrants are establishments closing within 
three years of entry.  Long-term entrants are establishments surviving four or more years.  The sample includes all states and DC, excepting 25 state-year cells where LBD 
files are not available, for 1,097 observations per regression.  Regressions include state and year fixed effects.  Regressions include unreported interactions of explanatory 
indicators with a Census-year indicator.  Regressions are weighted by average birth employment in states from 1977-1985.  Standard errors are clustered at the state cross-
sectional level.  Pre-Post specifications compare annual entry rates before and after the state-level banking deregulation indicated.  Linear Treatment Effect specifications 
allow for linear growth in treatment effects over time by modeling the number of years after the indicated deregulation's passage, with a long-term effect at four years.  The 
appendix reports these estimations with linear state time trends incorporated.
Table 3:  Entry and Exit Patterns at State-Year Level
Log Total Entrants Log Establishment Closures
A. Pre-Post Specifications
Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term EntrantsNew Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Firms Facility
Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Closures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.038 -0.015 -0.053 -0.023 -0.023 -0.009 -0.037 -0.001
(0.034) (0.023) (0.041) (0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.035)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. -0.040 -0.016 -0.058 -0.012 -0.026 -0.016 -0.037 0.017
(0.044) (0.044) (0.057) (0.055) (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.044 0.015 -0.063 0.027 -0.028 0.008 -0.050 0.020
(0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.036) (0.044) (0.038) (0.046)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.029 0.007 -0.039 0.003 -0.022 0.010 -0.038 -0.006
(0.047) (0.050) (0.054) (0.062) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.028 -0.016 0.000 -0.031 0.057 -0.005 -0.043 -0.043
(0.032) (0.027) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.062 0.004 0.028 -0.001 0.096 0.010 -0.020 -0.049
(0.034) (0.030) (0.048) (0.046) (0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.175 0.078 0.167 0.106 0.189 0.068 0.047 -0.036
(0.037) (0.034) (0.052) (0.052) (0.042) (0.029) (0.045) (0.042)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.227 0.124 0.272 0.152 0.194 0.115 0.163 0.015
(0.057) (0.046) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
Table 4:  Dynamic Specifications of Entry and Exit at State-Year Level
Notes: See Table 3.  Dynamic specifications model a series of leads and lags for each reform.  Leads and lags are consolidated into two-year increments extending from two 
years prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the deregulations.  Coefficient values for dynamic leads and lags are relative to the period three years before 
reforms and earlier.  The appendix reports these estimations with linear state time trends incorporated.
Response to Inter-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Log New Entrants Log Establishment Closures
Response to Intra-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term EntrantsLog Log Log Log
Entry Churning Long-Term Closure
Counts Entry Entry Counts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Post -0.012 -0.038 0.006 -0.020
Indicator x Start-Up Firms (0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Post 0.027 0.041 0.029 0.046
Indicator x Start-Up Firms (0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
Number of Years Since Intra-State  -0.010 -0.015 -0.006 -0.007
Banking Reform x Start-Up Firms (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Number of Years Since Inter-State  0.021 0.038 0.013 0.036
Banking Reform x Start-Up Firms (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
B. Linear Treatment Effect Specifications
A. Pre-Post Specifications
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities:
Table 5:  Relative Start-Up Entry and Exit Patterns at State-Industry-Type-Year Level
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities:
Notes:  Panel estimations consider establishment entry and exit patterns taken from the LBD for 1977-1998.  Dependent variables are indicated in 
column headers.  Annual cells are constructed by State-SIC2-Type, where Type includes single-unit firms and establishments of multi-unit firms.  All 
regressions include cross-sectional fixed effects for State-SIC2-Type and longitudinal fixed effects for Type-Year and State-SIC2-Year.  In these 
saturated models, single-unit responses are estimated relative to multi-unit responses.  Regressions include unreported indicator variables for cells 
with zero births and unreported interactions of explanatory variables with Census-year indicators.  Regressions are weighted by average birth 
employment in cells from 1977-1985.  Standard errors are clustered at the cross-sectional State-Type level.  Pre-Post specifications compare annual 
entry rates before and after the state-level banking deregulation indicated.  Linear Treatment Effect specifications allow for linear growth in treatment 
effects over time by modeling the number of years after the indicated deregulation's passage, with a long-term effect at four years.Log Log Log Log
Entry Churning Long-Term Closure
Counts Entry Entry Counts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.013 -0.020 -0.016 -0.028
(0.023) (0.035) (0.019) (0.032)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. -0.020 -0.039 -0.009 -0.049
(0.036) (0.045) (0.028) (0.037)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.084 -0.135 -0.059 -0.079
(0.036) (0.048) (0.032) (0.041)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.044 -0.061 -0.035 -0.028
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.023)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.021 0.040 0.025 0.006
(0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.022)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.038 0.061 0.044 0.045
(0.034) (0.040) (0.030) (0.028)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.071 0.115 0.067 0.097
(0.039) (0.054) (0.036) (0.040)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.109 0.220 0.059 0.173
(0.037) (0.054) (0.035) (0.045)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
Table 6:  Dynamic Specifications of Relative Start-Up Entry and Exit Responses
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities following
Intra-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities following
Inter-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Notes: See Table 5.  Dynamic specifications model a series of leads and lags for each reform.  Leads and lags are consolidated into two-year 
increments extending from two years prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the deregulations.  Coefficient values for dynamic leads 
and lags are relative to the period three years before reforms and earlier.1-5 Empl. 6-20 Empl. 21-100 Empl. 101+ Empl. 1-5 Empl. 6-20 Empl. 21-100 Empl. 101+ Empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Post 0.005 -0.044 0.015 -0.034 0.048 -0.013 -0.009 -0.034
Indicator x Start-Up Firms (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) (0.042) (0.018) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Post 0.047 0.040 -0.026 0.032 0.028 0.046 -0.003 0.005
Indicator x Start-Up Firms (0.019) (0.023) (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
Number of Years Since Intra-State  -0.002 -0.014 -0.006 -0.013 0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008
Banking Reform x Start-Up Firms (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Number of Years Since Inter-State  0.038 0.053 0.027 0.012 0.023 0.029 0.022 0.003
Banking Reform x Start-Up Firms (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
B. Linear Treatment Effect Specifications
Notes: See Table 5.  Table disaggregates churning and long-term entry by employment size of entrant in the first year of operation.  Coefficients report effects of start-up firms 
relative to facility expansions by multi-unit firms.
Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term Entrants
Table 7:  Size Distribution of Relative Start-Up Churning and Long-Term Entry Responses
A. Pre-Post Specifications1-5 Empl. 6-20 Empl. 21-100 Empl. 101+ Empl. 1-5 Empl. 6-20 Empl. 21-100 Empl. 101+ Empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.018 -0.016 -0.040 0.001 -0.023 -0.012 -0.061 -0.073
(0.034) (0.040) (0.030) (0.037) (0.024) (0.036) (0.032) (0.039)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. -0.028 -0.041 -0.015 -0.014 0.011 -0.045 -0.084 -0.070
(0.029) (0.046) (0.058) (0.068) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.081 -0.104 -0.051 -0.140 -0.051 -0.045 -0.038 -0.058
(0.030) (0.043) (0.040) (0.053) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.009 -0.068 0.045 -0.024 -0.004 -0.048 -0.053 -0.054
(0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.049) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.053 0.073 0.031 0.012 0.033 0.043 0.063 0.054
(0.022) (0.031) (0.046) (0.046) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038) (0.031)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.073 0.066 -0.022 0.032 0.036 0.072 0.031 0.040
(0.022) (0.031) (0.042) (0.053) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.135 0.165 0.066 0.049 0.105 0.124 0.092 0.045
(0.036) (0.045) (0.058) (0.084) (0.042) (0.033) (0.048) (0.037)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.226 0.289 0.107 -0.039 0.074 0.174 0.086 0.038
(0.048) (0.058) (0.061) (0.063) (0.051) (0.041) (0.056) (0.069)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
Table 8:  Dynamic Specifications of Size Distribution of Relative Start-Up Churning and Long-Term Entry Responses
Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term Entrants
Notes: See Table 7.  Dynamic specifications model a series of leads and lags for each reform.  Leads and lags are consolidated into two-year increments extending from two years 
prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the deregulations.  Coefficient values for dynamic leads and lags are relative to the period three years before reforms and 
earlier.
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities following
Intra-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities following
Inter-State Branch Banking Deregulations:Log Top 10 Log Top 10 Log Log Normalized Normalized
Incumbent  Incumbent  Top 10 Top 10 Herfindahl  Herfindahl 
Market Market Market Market Hirschman Hirschman
Share Share Share Share Index Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intra-State Banking  -0.019 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.026) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Inter-State Banking  -0.047 -0.044 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.001
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.033) (0.022) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
State-SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947
Number of Years Since  0.008 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
Intra-State Banking Reform (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Years Since  -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
Inter-State Banking Reform (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
State-SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947
Table 9:  Incumbent Market Shares and Concentration at State-Industry-Year Level
A. Pre-Post Specifications
B. Linear Treatment Effect Specifications
Notes:  Panel estimations consider concentration patterns taken from the LBD for 1977-1998.  Dependent variables are indicated in column 
headers.  Annual cells are constructed by State-SIC2.  Regressions include cross-sectional fixed effects for State-SIC2 and longitudinal fixed 
effects for SIC2-Year.  Regressions include unreported interactions of explanatory variables with Census-year indicators.  Regressions are 
weighted by average birth employment in cells from 1977-1985.  Standard errors are clustered at the cross-sectional State-SIC2 level.  
Incumbent firms are defined as the ten largest firms in 1980 by State-SIC2.  Market shares are calculated through employments.Log Top 10 Log Top 10 Log Log Normalized Normalized
Incumbent  Incumbent  Top 10 Top 10 Herfindahl  Herfindahl 
Market Market Market Market Hirschman Hirschman
Share Share Share Share Index Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.027 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.023 0.001 0.009 0.016 0.001 -0.001
(0.025) (0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.005 -0.016 -0.009 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.044) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.044 -0.008 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.037) (0.038) (0.017) (0.017) (0.003) (0.001)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.045 -0.035 -0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.000
(0.031) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. -0.085 -0.069 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.055) (0.029) (0.011) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.092 -0.078 -0.027 -0.028 0.000 0.000
(0.065) (0.032) (0.013) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.074 -0.073 -0.025 -0.026 0.000 0.001
(0.077) (0.041) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
State-SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947 55,947
Table 10:  Dynamic Analysis of Incumbent Market Shares and Concentration
Response to Intra-State Branch Banking Deregulations
Response to Inter-State Branch Banking Deregulations
Notes: See Table 9.  Dynamic specifications model a series of leads and lags for each reform.  Leads and lags are consolidated into two-year 
increments extending from two years prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the deregulations.  Coefficient values for dynamic 
leads and lags are relative to the period three years before reforms and earlier.Intra-State de novo Intra-State M&A Inter-State
State Deregulation Deregulation Deregulation
Alabama 1990 1981 1987
Alaska 1970 1970 1982
Arizona 1970 1970 1986
Arkansas Not deregulated 1994 1989
California 1970 1970 1987
Colorado Not deregulated 1991 1988
Connecticut 1988 1980 1983
Delaware 1970 1970 1988
District of Columbia 1970 1970 1985
Florida 1988 1988 1985
Georgia Not deregulated 1983 1985
Hawaii 1986 1986 Not deregulated
Idaho 1970 1970 1985
Illinois 1993 1988 1986
Indiana 1991 1989 1986
Iowa Not deregulated Not deregulated 1991
Kansas 1990 1987 1992
Kentucky Not deregulated 1990 1984
Louisiana 1988 1988 1987
Maine 1975 1975 1978
Maryland 1970 1970 1985
Massachusetts 1984 1984 1983
Michigan 1988 1987 1986
Minnesota Not deregulated 1993 1986
Mississippi 1989 1986 1988
Missouri 1990 1990 1986
Montana Not deregulated 1990 1993
Nebraska Not deregulated 1985 1990
Nevada 1970 1970 1985
New Hampshire 1987 1987 1987
New Jersey Not deregulated 1977 1986
New Mexico 1991 1991 1989
New York 1976 1976 1982
North Carolina 1970 1970 1985
North Dakota Not deregulated 1987 1991
Ohio 1989 1979 1985
Oklahoma Not deregulated 1988 1987
Oregon 1985 1985 1986
Pennsylvania 1990 1982 1986
Rhode Island 1970 1970 1984
South Carolina 1970 1970 1986
South Dakota 1970 1970 1988
Tennessee 1990 1985 1985
Texas 1988 1988 1987
Utah 1981 1981 1984
Vermont 1970 1970 1988
Virginia 1987 1978 1985
Washington 1985 1985 1987
West Virginia 1987 1987 1988
Wisconsin 1990 1990 1987
Wyoming Not deregulated 1988 1987
App. Table 1:  Timing of State Branch Banking Deregulations
Notes:   Data taken from Jayaratne and Strahan (1996).  Deregulations prior to 1970 are listed as 1970.New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Firms Facility
Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Closures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intra-State Banking  0.038 -0.034 0.014 -0.031 0.062 -0.033 -0.033 -0.059
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.022) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029)
Inter-State Banking  0.057 0.019 0.052 0.028 0.065 0.016 0.014 -0.036
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.021) (0.015) (0.032) (0.034) (0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
Number of Years Since  -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.007
Intra-State Banking Reform (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Number of Years Since  0.047 0.021 0.061 0.031 0.037 0.016 0.032 0.000
Inter-State Banking Reform (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
B. Linear Treatment Effect Specifications
Notes: See Table 3.
App. Table 2: Table 3 with Linear State Time Trends
Log Total Entrants Log Establishment Closures
A. Pre-Post Specifications
Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term EntrantsNew Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit New Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Single-Unit Facility Firms Facility
Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Start-Ups Expansions Closures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.046 -0.011 -0.063 -0.020 -0.026 -0.004 -0.018 0.006
(0.032) (0.026) (0.045) (0.047) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. -0.057 -0.018 -0.074 -0.020 -0.039 -0.016 -0.016 0.009
(0.045) (0.049) (0.067) (0.076) (0.034) (0.040) (0.048) (0.043)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.063 0.006 -0.078 0.005 -0.044 0.003 -0.022 0.004
(0.049) (0.052) (0.066) (0.065) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.054)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.055 0.015 -0.069 0.005 -0.037 0.021 -0.006 -0.022
(0.051) (0.058) (0.068) (0.085) (0.058) (0.053) (0.063) (0.065)
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.054 -0.014 0.034 -0.032 0.075 -0.002 -0.028 -0.053
(0.034) (0.023) (0.038) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.089 -0.005 0.069 -0.016 0.111 0.002 -0.009 -0.076
(0.035) (0.029) (0.046) (0.050) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.029)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.201 0.058 0.208 0.079 0.201 0.051 0.053 -0.073
(0.045) (0.037) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.234 0.081 0.292 0.101 0.188 0.076 0.148 -0.035
(0.073) (0.058) (0.079) (0.064) (0.076) (0.067) (0.053) (0.051)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097
Response to Inter-State Branch Banking Deregulations:
Notes: See Table 4.
App. Table 3:  Table 4 with Linear State Time Trends
Log New Entrants Log Churning Entrants Log Long-Term Entrants Log Establishment Closures
Response to Intra-State Branch Banking Deregulations:Single-Unit Start-Ups Interactions:
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs -0.034 (0.030) -0.013 (0.023)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yrs -0.040 (0.038) -0.020 (0.036)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs -0.051 (0.028) -0.084 (0.036)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs -0.032 (0.037) -0.044 (0.030)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs 0.032 (0.027) 0.021 (0.034)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yrs 0.056 (0.027) 0.038 (0.034)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs 0.153 (0.032) 0.071 (0.039)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs 0.201 (0.039) 0.109 (0.037)
Multi-Unit Facility Expansions Interactions:
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs -0.022 (0.030)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yrs -0.020 (0.048)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs 0.033 (0.044)
Intra-State Banking Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs 0.012 (0.052)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs 0.011 (0.034)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yrs 0.018 (0.037)
Inter-State Banking Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs 0.082 (0.036)





App. Table 4:  Transition Estimations from State-Year to State-Industry-Type-Year







Notes:  See Tables 4 and 6.  Column 1 documents State-SIC2-Type-Year estimations for entry counts without State-SIC2-
Year FE.  Column 1's coefficients parallel the State-Year analysis in Table 4.  The difference between these is due to the 
added industry dimension.  Column 2 further incorporates the State-SIC2-Year FE.  In these saturated models, the start-up 
response is estimated relative to facility expansions, and separate coefficients for expansion establishments are not estimated.1-5 Empl. 6-20 Empl. 21-100 Empl. 101+ Empl.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intra-State Branch Banking 
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. -0.024 -0.016 -0.044 -0.037
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.043)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.006 -0.051 -0.046 -0.021
(0.030) (0.039) (0.046) (0.052)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. -0.086 -0.078 -0.049 -0.129
(0.039) (0.036) (0.042) (0.051)
Lag 4+ Yrs. -0.029 -0.066 -0.059 -0.056
(0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.051)
Inter-State Branch Banking 
Fwd. 1-2 Yrs. 0.040 0.049 0.034 0.084
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035)
Lag 0-1 Yrs. 0.047 0.091 0.000 0.060
(0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.048)
Lag 2-3 Yrs. 0.122 0.144 0.054 0.117
(0.035) (0.038) (0.048) (0.039)
Lag 4+ Yrs. 0.149 0.227 0.076 0.079
(0.045) (0.038) (0.046) (0.045)
State-SIC2-Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-SIC2-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,894 111,894 111,894 111,894
Notes: See Table 8.
App. Table 5:  Size Distribution of Aggregate Relative Start-Up Entry
Log Entry Count
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities 
Start-Up Response Relative to Multi-Unit Facilities 